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SEARCH AND SEIZURE: NEW YORK VS. FEDERAL 
APPROACH 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
BRONX COUNTY 
People v. Keita1 
(Decided May 19, 2011) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Keita was charged with criminal possession of a 
forged instrument in the second degree, criminal possession of stolen 
property in the third degree, and grand larceny in the third degree in 
the Supreme Court of Bronx County, New York, based on his use of 
a bank account with insufficient funds or “check kiting.”2  Keita 
moved to suppress the statements and documents that the arresting 
officers collected and sought to offer at trial.3  He argued that the evi-
dence was obtained without probable cause in violation of Article 1, 
section 12, of the New York Constitution and the Fourth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.4  He further alleged that the evi-
 
1 No. 2862-2009, 2011 WL 1936076 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2011). 
2 Id. at *1-2. 
3 Id. at *1. 
4 Id.  Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution, in relevant part, states “[t]he 
right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”  N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12.  The Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
1
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dence was obtained in violation of Miranda.5  Thus, the court consi-
dered two issues of constitutional significance.  The first issue was 
whether the agents‟ search and seizure was in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.6  The secondary issue 
was whether the Miranda warnings were properly given to Keita; and 
if they were, whether Keita properly waived them.7 
The first issue was discussed in detail in the court‟s opinion.  
In New York, there are four levels of interaction that exist between 
government agents and private citizens that must be scrutinized when 
discussing the issue of search and seizure.8  However, in a federal 
constitutional analysis, there are three levels of interaction between 
government agents and private citizens that the courts scrutinize 
when discussing this issue.9  This note will distinguish between the 
federal analysis and the New York State analysis on this issue by us-
ing People v. Keita as an example. 
 
II. FACTS 
In 2009, the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) investi-
gated new account fraud in the Bronx and Manhattan counties of 
New York and set up a joint surveillance operation with Secret Ser-
vice agents and fraud investigators of other agencies.10  A postal tel-
ler at the post office was told to inform agents if anyone purchased 
multiple money orders in amounts less than $3,000, which would tip 
 
5 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076 at *1 (referring to right that suspected perpetrators have to re-
main silent and to have an attorney present when the perpetrator is being arrested first enun-
ciated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996)). 
6 Id. at *4. 
7 Id. at *11. 
8 People v. DeBour, 352 N.E.2d 562, 571-72 (N.Y. 1976). 
9 Bordeaux v. Lynch, 958 F. Supp. 77, 85 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
10 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *2.  The scheme involves a perpetrator enlisting a custom-
er to open a new bank account to obtain a debit card.  Id.  The perpetrator then gives the cus-
tomer a counterfeit check to deposit into the account.  Id.  In the next few days, the new ac-
count holder makes a number of ATM withdrawals for the perpetrator‟s benefit.  Id.  The 
perpetrator then gives the account holder a portion of the withdrawn money.  Id.  The joint 
surveillance operation was located at a Post Office at 588 Grand Concourse in Bronx Coun-
ty.  Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *2.  For the operation, Detective Woods from the Financial 
Crimes Task Force and Inspector Larco from the USPS collaborated with the Secret Service 
and other agencies.  Id. at *1. 
2
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the agents off as to who was committing the new account fraud.11  
During the surveillance operation, Keita used a Citibank debit card 
and purchased three money orders.12  Two of the money orders were 
in the amount of $1,000 each and one was in the amount of $500.13  
The postal teller grew suspicious and gave a detailed description of 
Defendant Keita to Detective Woods and Inspector Larco, who then 
approached Keita.14 
The agents requested that Keita provide his identification, the 
money orders, and the Citibank debit card that he used to purchase 
the money orders.15  Keita provided his student identification card, 
which only gave the agents Keita‟s name and not his address, social 
security number, or date of birth, and accompanied the agents to a 
private location.16  The agents never drew their guns while question-
ing Keita nor did they ever come in physical contact with Keita.17  
During Keita‟s questioning, the agents learned that only days earlier 
two starter checks were deposited into a bank account associated with 
the debit card Keita provided to the agents.18  The agents then learned 
that the checks were drawn from a closed Citibank account and that 
there was no more than a $300 balance in the new Citibank account.19  
From this, the agents suspected that Keita was involved in new ac-
count fraud because this is the type of behavior that the agents were 
looking for.20  Keita was then transferred to a police precinct and was 
“administered Miranda warnings.”21  Keita provided both an oral and 
written waiver of his Miranda rights, knowingly and voluntarily 
waiving such rights.22 
 
11 Id. at *2. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *2. 
15 Id. 
16 Id.  There were as many as six agents in the location at one time.  Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076,  at *2-3. 
19 Id. at *3. 
20 Id. *2. 
21 Id. at *3. 
22 Id. at *3, *11.  Keita was placed in an interview room where Detective Woods intended 
to elicit an incriminating response.  Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *11.  This is where Keita 
was read his Miranda warnings.  Id.  After hearing each of the warnings, Keita acknowl-
edged receiving and understanding each one and voluntarily elected to waive them.  Id.  He 
did this through a form entitled “INTERROGATION WARNINGS TO PERSONS IN 
POLICE CUSTODY.”  Id.  Each warning was listed on the form and Keita wrote “yes” 
3
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Keita was charged with criminal possession of a forged in-
strument in the second degree, criminal possession of stolen property 
in the third degree, and grand larceny in the third degree largely 
based upon statements made to and evidence obtained by the agents 
who arrested him.23  Keita moved to suppress this evidence alleging 
that the evidence was obtained without probable cause in violation of 
Article 1, section 12, of the New York Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and in violation of Mi-
randa.24  The court ordered a Mapp-Huntley hearing to determine 
whether Keita‟s motion to suppress the evidence should be granted.25  
Ultimately, Keita‟s motion to suppress was denied.26 
 
III. WAS KEITA’S SEARCH AND SEIZURE REASONABLE? – THE 
NEW YORK APPROACH 
The court began its opinion by stating that in the State of New 
York, the People have the initial burden in a suppression hearing to 
present evidence to show that the officers had reasonable or probable 
cause to make an arrest.27  The People must prove that the circums-
tances and the defendant‟s behavior “justified the arresting officer‟s 
intrusion.”28  Furthermore, this intrusion must comport with a four-
 
signed his initials after each one.  Id.  Furthermore, Keita signed his name at the bottom of 
the form.  Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *11.  
A Miranda Warning reads as follows: 
You have the right to remain silent.  Anything you say can and will be 
used against you in a court of law.  You have the right to an attorney.  If 
you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for you.  Do you un-
derstand the rights I have just read to you?  With these rights in mind, do 
you with to speak to me?   
What are your Miranda Rights?, MIRANDAWARNING.COM, http://www.miranda 
warning.org/whatareyourmirandarights.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
23 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *1. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.  A Mapp-Huntley hearing occurs in order to determine whether to suppress state-
ments made by a defendant to a law enforcement officer, prosecutor, or their agents on the 
ground that the defendant was not advised of his constitutional rights to remain silent or was 
forced to make the statements by either threats or coercion.  See, e.g., Allen N. Cowling, Ba-
sic Criminal Procedure From Arrest Through Trial, http://www.allencowling 
.com/false04B.htm (last visited Sep. 29, 2011). 
26 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *1. 
27 Id. at *3 (referring to People v. Baldwin, 250 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1969)). 
28 Id. 
4
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tiered approach set forth by the New York Court of Appeals in 
People v. DeBour.29  The court in DeBour summarized “the gradation 
of permissible police authority with respect to encounters with citi-
zens in public places and [the court] directly correlated the degree of 
objectively credible belief with the permissible scope of interfe-
rence.”30 
The first level of intrusion is an approach to request informa-
tion, permissible only when there is an “objective credible reason” 
for an interference.31  Police do not necessarily need to suspect crimi-
nal activity.32  The second level of intrusion is known as the “com-
mon-law right to inquire” and is permissible only when the officer 
has a “founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”33  This is a 
greater intrusion because the officer can interfere with a citizen in an 
effort to “gain explanatory information.”34  However, at this level the 
intrusion must fall “short of a forcible seizure.”35  The third level of 
intrusion is authorized when an officer has “a reasonable suspicion 
that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to 
commit a felony or misdemeanor.”36  At this level, an officer is also 
authorized to make a forcible stop and detain the citizen for question-
ing.37  Furthermore, an officer is also given the right to frisk the indi-
vidual “if the officer reasonably suspects that he is in danger of phys-
ical injury by virtue of the detainee being armed.”38  The fourth and 
 
29 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976). 
30 Id. at 571-72. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 572. 
33 Id. 
34 DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 572. 
35 Id.  The court has consistently limited the power of law enforcement officers to gain 
explanatory information when it is “exercised solely for the basis of vague suspicion or as a 
means of harassment.”  People v. Cantor, 324 N.E.2d 872, 878 (N.Y. 1975). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. (referring to N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §140.50(1)), which states: 
In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest 
without a warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a public place 
located within the geographical area of such officer‟s employment when 
he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or 
is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in 
the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an expla-
nation of his conduct. 
38 Id. (referring to N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §140.50(3)), which states: 
When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdi-
5
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final level of intrusion allows the officer to make an arrest and take a 
citizen into custody if the officer “has reasonable cause to believe 
that person has committed a crime, whether in his presence or other-
wise.”39  Each progressive level requires a separate degree of suspi-
cion by the investigating officer.40  The court in Keita applied these 
levels to determine whether Keita‟s search and seizure was reasona-
ble under the circumstances of the case and is discussed in detail be-
low. 
A. The First Level of Intrusion – Request for 
Information 
The first level of intrusion allows a state law enforcement of-
ficer to request information if there is an objective, credible, and arti-
culate reason to request it.41  “A request for [general] information in-
volves basic, nonthreatening questions such as, identity, address or 
destination.”42  In Keita, the officer‟s inquiry was entirely proper un-
der the first tier because she was notified by the postal teller, thus 
providing the officer with a credible and objective reason to question 
Keita.43  Furthermore, fraudulent identification was commonly used 
in new account fraud so when Keita did not provide adequate identi-
fication, the officer was entitled to delve deeper and ask to see Kei-
ta‟s money orders and debit card.44  Therefore, the court determined 
that the officers‟ actions were reasonable under the circumstances.45 
 
visions one and two a police officer or court officer, as the case may be, 
reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search 
such person for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance 
readily capable of causing serious physical injury and of a sort not ordi-
narily carried in public places by law-abiding persons.  If he finds such a 
weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which he rea-
sonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, he may take 
it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he 
shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person. 
39 DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 572 (referring to N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §140.10(1)(b).). 
40 People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204, 206 (N.Y. 1992). 
41 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *3-4. 
42 Hollman, 590 N.E.2d at 206; accord, People v. Carter, 790 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (App. 
Div. 1st Dep‟t 2005) (questioning a suspect at a bus terminal regarding his trip was proper 
because the suspect was in a restricted area designated for bus passengers). 
43 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *4. 
44 Id. at *5. 
45 Id. 
6
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B. The Second Level of Intrusion – Common Law 
Right of Inquiry 
The second level of intrusion or “common-law right of in-
quiry” views the citizen more in terms of a suspected law breaker and 
the agent must determine whether there is a “ „founded suspicion that 
criminal activity is afoot.‟ ”46  Like the level-one approach, the offic-
er may not make physical contact with the suspect; he may only inter-
fere with the suspect to gain explanatory information.47  Such ques-
tions may be used to elicit an incriminating response and may be 
characterized as an intimidating experience; whereas, the level one 
intrusion is characterized as “merely unsettling.”48 
In this case, the agents‟ request for certain documents moved 
from a level-one inquiry to a level-two inquiry when Keita gave one 
of the agents a non-governmental identification card that shared the 
same name that appeared on the Citibank debit card.49  The identifi-
cation card and the debit card created a “founded suspicion that crim-
inal activity was afoot” in the officers‟ collective minds, especially 
since the officers had expertise in new account fraud.50  Thus, the 
court held that the brief intrusion to gain explanatory information was 
justified by the totality of circumstances because the officers‟ con-
duct comported with a level-two common-law right of inquiry.51 
 
46 Id. (quoting DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 572). 
47 Id.  
48 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *5 (referring to Hollman, 590 N.E.2d at 210). 
Once the police officer‟s questions become extended and accusatory and 
the officer's inquiry focuses on the possible criminality of the person ap-
proached, this is not a simple request for information.  Where the person 
approached from the content of the officer‟s questions might reasonably 
believe that he or she is suspected of some wrongdoing, the officer is no 
longer merely asking for information.  The encounter has become a 
common-law inquiry that must be supported by founded suspicion that 
criminality is afoot.  No matter how calm the tone of narcotics officers 
may be, or how polite their phrasing, a request to search a bag is intru-
sive and intimidating and would cause reasonable people to believe that 
they were suspected of criminal conduct.  These factors take the encoun-
ter past a simple request for information. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at *5-6. 
7
Mirman: Fourth Amendment
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
758 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
C. The Third Level of Intrusion – Forcible Seizure 
The third level of intrusion is characterized as a “forcible sei-
zure,” which is the physical or constructive detainment of an individ-
ual by virtue of significant interruption of his liberty of movement re-
sulting from police action.52  At this level, the officer must have a 
reasonable suspicion that the individual is committing, has commit-
ted, or is about to commit a crime.53  Reasonable suspicion has been 
defined as that „“quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordi-
nary prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe 
criminal activity is at hand.‟”54  Hunches are not sufficient to meet 
the reasonable suspicion standard; the officer must be able to state the 
facts that caused his suspicion.55 
New York adopted a reasonable person test to determine 
whether a seizure occurred.56  In New York the question is “whether 
a reasonable person would have believed, under the circumstances, 
that the officer‟s conduct was a significant limitation on his or her 
freedom.”57  Standing alone, a verbal command does not usually con-
stitute a seizure.58  However, if the verbal command is coupled with, 
but not limited to, physical contact, blocking the path of a vehicle, us-
ing loudspeakers, or pointing a gun, a seizure has occurred.59 
In Keita, Keita voluntarily followed the officers to a private 
location and even though there were, at times, six officers in the room 
 
52 Id. at *6; see also People v. Martinez, 606 N.E.2d 951, 952 (N.Y. 1992) (“[F]orcible 
stops and seizures . . . take place whenever an individual‟s freedom of movement is signifi-
cantly impeded.”). 
53 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *6. 
54 Id. at *6 (quoting People v. Cantor, 324 N.E.2d 872, 877 (N.Y. 1975)). 
55 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (“Courts have used a variety of 
terms to capture the elusive concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a 
person.  Terms like „articulable reasons‟ and „founded suspicion‟ are not self-defining; they 
fall short of providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual situations that arise.  
But the essence of all that has been written is that the totality of the circumstances – the 
whole picture – must be taken into account.  Based upon the whole picture the detaining of-
ficers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 
stopped of criminal activity.”). 
56 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *6. 
57 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
58 People v. Bora, 634 N.E.2d 168, 170 (N.Y. 1994); see, e.g., People v. Townes, 359 
N.E.2d 402, 404-405 (1976) (finding a seizure where a police officer who was not wearing 
his uniform exited an unmarked car, wielded his firearm, and yelled “Freeze Police” at two 
men). 
59 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *6-7. 
8
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with him, the officers never had their guns drawn.
 60  The court found 
that the officers‟ conduct did not significantly limit Keita‟s personal 
liberty; thus, there was no seizure.61  The court then needed to decide 
whether the officers did, in fact, have reasonable suspicion to conduct 
a forcible detention or probable cause to make an arrest.62  However, 
because the officers gained information from an outside source, the 
court first had to determine if the information had sufficient reliabili-
ty to justify the forcible encounter.63 
To prove the informant‟s credibility, the People needed to 
prove that the informant was reliable and that he or she had a basis of 
knowledge.64  Anonymous information is usually considered unrelia-
ble to constitute the basis for reasonable suspicion.65  The informants 
in Keita included a postal teller, a Citibank fraud investigator, and a 
Capital One fraud investigator, who the court determined were all 
identifiable and reliable sources with experience in the field of bank 
accounts and fraud.66  Furthermore, coupled with the agents‟ observa-
tions of Keita, information given by the informants was highly corro-
borated.67  Thus, even though the agents‟ initial questioning satisfied 
the level-two inquiry, further detention after the initial inquiry was 
acceptable under the level-three reasonable suspicion standard allow-
ing for a forcible seizure.68 
D. The Fourth Level of Intrusion – Probable Cause 
The fourth level of intrusion under DeBour allows a police of-
ficer to make a full-blown arrest as long as he has probable cause to 
believe that the person has committed a crime, whether in his pres-
ence or not.69  The court in Keita provided two ways that probable 
 
60 Id. at *2. 
61 Id. at *7. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 People v. Wirchansky, 359 N.E.2d 666, 667 (N.Y. 1976) (applying the principle to a 
warranted arrest by the police).  The court in Keita explained that the principle is no less re-
levant in a warrantless arrest and search by the police.  2011 WL 1936076, at *7. 
65 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *7. 
66 Id. at *8. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
9
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cause can be established.70  First, the court stated that reasonable 
cause is present when “evidence or information which appears relia-
ble discloses facts or circumstances which . . . collectively . . . con-
vince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment, and experience that 
it is reasonably likely that [the] offense was committed and . . . such 
person committed it.”71  Put in simpler terms, probable cause exists 
when it is more likely than not that a crime took place and that the ar-
restee was the perpetrator.72  Probable cause does not mean that the 
officer knew for a fact that a crime was committed; the officer needs 
to be merely aware that some crime may have been committed.73  
Probable cause can also be established through an officer‟s observa-
tion of a perpetrator‟s seemingly innocent activities when the officer 
has expertise in the particular area of criminal activity.74  The totality 
and reasonableness of the circumstances must also be taken into ac-
count because no two criminal investigations are exactly alike.75 
Lastly, the court noted that the evidence was not unlawfully 
obtained.76  The court determined that the officers had reasonable 
cause to arrest Keita.77  The officers established reasonable cause 
when they learned of Keita‟s Citibank account status, the nature of 
the fraudulent Capital One checks, and Keita‟s purchase of the mon-
ey orders for less than $3,000.78  The debit card and money orders 
were visible when Keita used the debit card to purchase the money 
orders and Keita voluntarily provided them to the officers.79  Thus, on 
the first issue, the court held that the officers‟ search and seizure of 
the evidence was reasonable under the circumstances.80 
 
 
70 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *8.  It is important to note that the court uses the terms 
“probable cause” and “reasonable cause” interchangeably.  Id. 
71 Id. (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §70.10[2] (McKinney 2011)). 
72 Id. 
73 People v. Wilmer, 457 N.Y.S.2d 934, 935 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 1982). 
74 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *8.  “Modus operandi” is the pattern of criminal activity so 
distinctive that officers who have expertise in the particular field of criminal activity may 
attribute it to the work of the same person.  Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at *9. 
77 Id. at *8. 
78 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *8.  
79 Id. at *9.  
80 Id. at *8. 
10
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IV. WAS KEITA’S SEARCH AND SEIZURE REASONABLE? – 
FEDERAL APPROACH 
By establishing the four-tier approach, New York State ex-
panded the Fourth Amendment protection against illegal search and 
seizure by relying on its State Constitution.81  The Fourth Amend-
ment established the minimum protection required in a criminal 
search and seizure.82  For a defendant to sustain a constitutional 
claim, the defendant must prove that the officers acted under color of 
federal law to deprive the defendant of his constitutionally protected 
right.83  In a federal constitutional analysis, three levels of interaction, 
rather than the four levels of interaction in New York, exist between 
government agents and private citizens.84  The first level of interac-
tion is a “consensual encounter,” which does not require justifica-
tion.85  The second level of interaction is an “investigative detention,” 
which requires a reasonable suspicion that crime has occurred or 
crime will occur in the near future.86  Finally, the third level of inte-
raction is a full-blown “arrest,” which requires a showing of probable 
cause.87  The next three sections of this note describe in detail the 
three levels of interaction under federal law. 
A. The First Level of Interaction – Consensual 
Encounter 
The first level of interaction, the consensual encounter, does 
not require justification as long as the police do not indicate that 
compliance with their requests is required.88  “Law enforcement of-
ficers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching 
an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if 
he is willing to answer some questions, by putting questions to him if 
the person is willing to listen, or by offering in evidence in a criminal 
 
81 Compare DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72 with Bordeaux v. Lynch, 958 F. Supp. 77, 85-
86 (N.D.N.Y 1997). 
82 Bordeaux, 958 F. Supp. at 84. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 85. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Bordeaux, 958 F. Supp. at 85. 
88 United States v. Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1995). 
11
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prosecution his voluntary answers to such questions.”89 
For example, in Bordeaux v. Lynch,90 two women, Bordeaux 
and Sweeney, were engaged in suspicious behavior at an airport and 
caught the attention of a Task Force informant while they were stand-
ing in the baggage claim area.91  Agents then followed the women 
from the airport, to their motel, then to a bus station.92  At the bus sta-
tion, the agents approached the women and inquired about their iden-
tification and destination.93  The agents were highly suspicious of a 
black bag that the women were traveling with and noticed that Bor-
deaux‟s airline ticket bore a different name than her own.94  The court 
held that because the officers approached the women in a public 
place and asked them if they were willing to answer questions and the 
women voluntarily agreed, the officers did not violate Bordeaux‟s 
Fourth Amendment rights and their interaction was justified as a con-
sensual encounter.95 
B. The Second Level of Interaction – Investigative 
Detention 
After learning more information from the consensual encoun-
ter, officers have the authority to turn the encounter into an investiga-
tive detention, the second level of interaction under federal law.96  In 
the federal system, there are two levels of seizure of a person.97  The 
first level, which is also the second level of interaction, is the inves-
tigative detention, which requires reasonable suspicion in the minds 
of the officers “that criminal activity . . . occurred or is about to oc-
cur.”98  This is known as a Terry stop.99  Unlike New York, which 
adopted the reasonable person test discussed above to determine 
 
89 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). 
90 958 F. Supp. 77 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
91 Bordeaux, 958 F. Supp. at 81.  The two women were in the Syracuse Airport, and the 
informant was working with the Central New York Task Force.  Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Bordeaux, 958 F. Supp. at 85. 
96 Id. 
97 Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 98 (2d Cir. 1991). 
98 Tehrani, 49 F.3d at 58. 
99 Posr, 944 F.2d at 98. 
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whether a seizure occurred,100 the federal courts apply a narrower de-
finition of seizure to merely include physical restraint.101 
In Terry v. Ohio,102 the Supreme Court explained that an of-
ficer can briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the of-
ficer has reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that 
criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer does not have prob-
able cause.103  When officers conduct a Terry stop, they must “em-
ploy[ ] „the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or 
dispel their suspicion in a short period of time.‟ ”104  “Investigative 
detentions[ ] involve[ ] reasonably brief encounters in which a rea-
sonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to 
leave.”105 
Furthermore, in this level of interaction, the Supreme Court 
has held that law enforcement officers may do a limited search of a 
suspect‟s outer garments if they reasonably believe that the detainee 
may be armed and dangerous.106  The Court stated that this protective 
search for weapons is merely a brief intrusion, rather than an “incon-
siderable[ ] intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.”107  Further-
more, the officer does not need to be certain that the individual is 
armed; it must only be true that “a reasonably prudent [person] would 
be warranted in the belief to believe that his safety or that of others 
was in danger.”108  This belief cannot come from a hunch, but from 
“specific reasonable inferences which [the officer] is entitled to draw 
from the facts in light of his experience.”109 
 
 
 
100 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *6. 
101 Id. 
102 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
103 Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (holding that detention and search of an individual by officers 
was justified, for protection of themselves and others, because the officers had reasonable 
grounds to believe the individual was armed and dangerous). 
104 Posr, 944 F.2d at 98. 
105 Id. (quoting United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551, 1556 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
106 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
107 Id. at 26. 
108 Id. at 27. 
109 Id. 
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C. The Third Level of Interaction – Arrest 
The second level of seizure is also the third level of intrusive-
ness under federal law, which is known as an arrest.110  An arrest oc-
curs when the totality of the circumstances indicates that the encoun-
ter between the private citizen and officer becomes too invasive to be 
considered an investigative detention.111  Furthermore, the govern-
ment has a greater burden at this level than it needs for an investiga-
tive detention, in that the government needs to prove probable cause, 
rather than merely reasonable suspicion.112  It is sometimes difficult 
to determine when an actual arrest occurs because there is no set list 
of formalities required.113  An arrest may even occur “if the formal 
words of arrest have not been spoken provided that the [individual 
being detained] is restrained and [that individual‟s] freedom of 
movement is restricted.”114  For example, in Tehrani, the court held 
that the officer‟s actions of holding the defendant in detention for 
more than 30 minutes in a private airport office, which caused the de-
fendant to miss his flight, did not amount to an arrest.115  The officer 
made speedy and appropriate inquiries in a reasonable way; thus, the 
thirty-minute detention was no longer than necessary to effectuate the 
officer‟s purpose.116 
 
V. STATEMENTS GIVEN BY KEITA AFTER THE MIRANDA 
WARNINGS 
Because the court in Keita found that the officers did have 
reasonable grounds for a lawful arrest of Keita, the second issue was 
whether the Miranda warnings were properly given to Keita upon his 
arrest and if they were, whether Keita properly waived them.117  The 
Supreme Court enunciated warnings that need to be given before any 
custodial interrogation conducted by law enforcement agents in its 
 
110 Tehrani, 49 F. 3d at 58. 
111 Bordeaux, 958 F. Supp. at 86. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 87 (referring to Tehrani, 49 F.3d at 61). 
116 Tehrani, 49 F.3d at 61. 
117 See Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *9-11. 
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1966 decision, Miranda v. Arizona.118  New York parallels this feder-
al approach.119  A suspect must be aware of the fact that, during ques-
tioning, he has the right to remain silent and he has the right to have 
an attorney present.120  However, after being made aware of these 
rights, the suspect can waive them “voluntarily, knowingly, and intel-
ligently.”121  The court in Keita broke down the Miranda analysis into 
three parts: custody, interrogation, and waiver.122 
To determine whether a defendant is in custody, the test turns 
upon what a reasonable, innocent man would believe if he were in the 
defendant‟s position.123  It is an objective test so it does not matter 
what a particular defendant actually thought.124  In making this as-
sessment, the totality of circumstances must be considered.125  The 
mere fact that a defendant was interviewed in a police station does 
not automatically mean that he was in custody.126  The mere fact that 
a defendant was interviewed in a police station does not automatical-
ly mean that he was in custody.127  This questioning within a police 
station is merely one circumstance that should be considered.  Other 
such circumstances that should be considered include “whether the 
defendant voluntarily appeared at, or accompanied officers to, the po-
lice station and whether the questioning was conducted in a non-
coercive [manner].”128 
Under Miranda, interrogation refers to express questioning 
and “any words or actions on the part of the police [officers] . . . that 
the police should know are . . . likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse” from a defendant.129  There are certain exemptions that are 
 
118 Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (holding that the accused must be 
clearly informed of his right to remain silent; that what he says can and will be used against 
him at trial; that he has the right to have an attorney present during questioning; and that if 
he is indigent, the court may appoint an attorney for him at no cost to him). 
119 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *9. 
120 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
121 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *9. 
122 Id. at *9-11. 
123 People v. Yukl, 256 N.E.2d 172, 174 (N.Y. 1969). 
124 Id. 
125 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *9. 
126 Yukl, 256 N.E.2d at 174 (referring to United States v. Bird, 293 F. Supp. 1265, 1271-
72 (1968)). 
127 Id. 
128 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *9. 
129 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). 
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not considered interrogations.  For example, in response to an offic-
er‟s general inquires during the preliminary stages of the investiga-
tion process, the statements made are not regarded as results of an in-
terrogation.130  Interrogation also does not occur when statements are 
made by the defendant without any inducement from the law en-
forcement officers altogether; these statements are merely spontane-
ous.131 
Like custody, an objective test is used to determine what con-
stitutes interrogation of a suspect.132  The test is “whether an objec-
tive observer with the same knowledge concerning the suspect as the 
police had would conclude that the remark or conduct of the police 
was reasonably likely to elicit a response.”133  The court held that the 
statements that Keita made “were clearly products of a custodial in-
terrogation intended to elicit an incriminating response.”134 
The last part of the court‟s Miranda analysis involved wheth-
er Keita voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda 
rights.135  The burden was on the People to prove that Keita “volunta-
rily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his . . . rights”; if he did, 
then the oral and written statements he made to the agents were ad-
missible as evidence.136  “Voluntariness centers around whether . . . 
[the officers] use[d] . . . coercive techniques . . . [to] extract a state-
ment with complete disregard of whether or not [the defendant] spoke 
the truth.”137  The United States Supreme Court stated that “convic-
tions following the admission into evidence of confessions which are 
involuntary, i.e., the product of coercion, either physical or psycho-
logical, cannot stand.”138  Furthermore, when determining whether 
 
130 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *10. 
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Id. (quoting People v. Ferro, 62 N.Y.2d 316, 319 (1984)). 
134 Id. at *11. 
135 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *10-11. 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 10.  
138 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540 (1961)).  Defendant was brought in for ques-
tioning and the officers told him that they would take his wife into custody if he did not coo-
perate and confess to the crime.  Id. at 535.  The court held that the defendant‟s statements 
were inadmissible because he was subject to pressures that an accused should not be sub-
jected to during an interrogation.  Id. at 538.  Psychological or physical coercion offends the 
underlying principle in our criminal justice system: that our system is an accusatorial, not an 
inquisitorial one.  Id. at 540-41.  Thus, the State must establish guilt by evidence freely and 
independently secured from the accused.  Id. at 541.  Furthermore, if the statements are invo-
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the defendant voluntarily gave his statement, the court looks at the to-
tality of circumstances.139  Such circumstances include “interrogation 
techniques, [including] physical abuse [and] psychological pressure, 
food or sleep deprivation, and promises of immunity and pay-
ment.”140 
In Keita, the court found that “the People clearly established 
that the Miranda warnings were properly administered and that [Kei-
ta] voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived them.”141  The 
agents read Keita his Miranda rights before Keita made his verbal 
and written statements, “which were clearly products of a custodial 
interrogation that was conducted to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse.”142  After hearing each warning, Keita waived his rights when 
he wrote “yes” and signed his initials on the form provided for the 
purpose of waiving these rights.143 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The court in Keita ultimately held that the arresting officers 
properly approached Keita at the outset of the investigation, they then 
conducted a proper investigatory inquiry, and in due course possessed 
the probable cause to justify a forcible stop and arrest.144  Further-
more, the Miranda rights were properly administered and voluntarily 
waived by Keita.145   
Based on New York and federal case law, it is evident that the 
Federal process regarding illegal search and seizure is not as detailed 
as the New York approach.  Rather than merely following federal 
guidelines, New York State has expanded the Fourth Amendment 
protection.  While there are four levels that must be scrutinized in de-
termining whether law enforcement officers conducted a reasonable 
 
luntary, the statements are inadmissible for all purposes, including impeachment and rebut-
tal.  Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *10. 
139 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *10. 
140 Id. at *10-11. 
141 Id. at *11. 
142 Id. 
143 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *11.  Furthermore, after Keita made a verbal statement, 
he handwrote a statement in what appeared to be his own words.  Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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search and seizure in New York State, there are three levels under 
federal law.146  The progressive levels in both approaches require a 
separate degree of suspicion by the investigating officer.  On the oth-
er hand, as detailed above, there are numerous differences between 
the two approaches.  In the first level of both approaches, law en-
forcement officers are allowed to approach an individual and ask him 
or her general questions.147  However, under the Federal approach, no 
justification is required so long as law enforcement officers make it 
clear that answering their questions is unnecessary.148  This directly 
contrasts with the level one request for information in New York, 
which requires a law enforcement official to have an objective, credi-
ble, and articulate reason for questioning an individual.149 
Whereas the first levels in both approaches can be seen as 
somewhat equivalent, the basic right to approach a citizen on the 
street with low levels of cause, the second level of intrusion in New 
York State, or the “common law right of inquiry,” does not have an 
equivalent in the federal approach.  The common law right of inquiry 
is allowed if the officer has “a founded suspicion that criminal activi-
ty is afoot”; this stops short of a seizure and no physical contact is 
permitted.150 
However, the second level of the federal approach amounts to 
a seizure upon an individual, in the form of an investigative detention 
which requires reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity occurred 
or is about to occur.”151  New York law does not permit a law en-
forcement officer to commit a seizure until a level three intrusion, a 
“forcible seizure.”152  The third level of the New York approach can 
be easily compared to the second level of the federal approach.  At 
the third level in New York, the “officer must have reasonable suspi-
cion that the individual is committing, has committed, or is about to 
commit a crime.”153  To determine what amounts to a seizure, New 
York adopted a “reasonable person test” and the question is “whether 
a reasonable person would have believed, under the circumstances, 
 
146 Bordeaux, 958 F. Supp. at 85. 
147 Tehrani, 49 F.3d at 58; DeBour, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72. 
148 Tehrani, 49 F.3d at 58. 
149 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *4. 
150 Id. at *5. 
151 Tehrani, 49 F.3d at 58. 
152 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *6. 
153 Id. 
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that the officer‟s conduct was a significant limitation on his or her 
freedom.”154  Under this test, “a verbal command, standing alone, 
[does] not usually [amount to] a seizure.”155  However, if a verbal 
command is coupled with physical contact, blocking the path of a ve-
hicle, using loudspeakers, or pointing a gun at the individual, courts 
will usually find that a seizure has occurred.156  However, this is a 
broad definition compared to the narrower definition of what consti-
tutes a seizure under federal law.157  The federal courts apply a nar-
rower definition of seizure to merely include physical restraint.158 
The last level of each approach, the fourth level of intrusion in 
New York law and the third level of interaction under federal law, 
amount to a full blown arrest by the investigating officer.159  Under 
New York law, a law enforcement officer must have probable cause 
to arrest an individual, similar to federal law where probable cause is 
required as well.160  However, it is odd that the court in Keita used the 
terms “reasonable” and “probable” cause interchangeably at this lev-
el.161  This oddity is evident when the court provided two ways to de-
termine probable cause.162  The opinion first referred to a New York 
statute and said that reasonable cause is present when “evidence or 
information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances 
which . . . collectively . . . convince a person of ordinary intelligence, 
judgment, and experience that it is reasonably likely that [the] offense 
was committed and . . . such person committed it.”163  The court then 
went on to provide that another way to prove probable cause is 
through the officer‟s observation of an individual‟s seemingly inno-
cent activities, given the officer‟s expertise in a specific criminal ac-
tivity.164 
It is evident that the federal approach and the New York ap-
proach to determine whether there was a reasonable search and sei-
 
154 Id. 
155 Bora, 634 N.E.2d at 170. 
156 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *6-7. 
157 Id. at *6. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at *8; Tehrani, 49 F.3d at 58. 
160 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *8; Bordeaux, 958 F. Supp. at 86. 
161 Keita, 2011 WL 1936076, at *8. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §70.10[2] (McKinney 2011)). 
164 Id. 
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zure vary in numerous ways.  However, both approaches assure that 
an individual‟s constitutional right against unreasonable search and 
seizure will be protected and both approaches must be strictly fol-
lowed. 
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